Trump’s continuing success

As I posted earlier, our study of previous successful presidential candidates shows that success is very strongly correlated with a particular language model, consisting of:

  • Uniformly positive language
  • Complete absence of negative language
  • Using uplifting, aspirational metaphors rather than policy proposals, and
  • Ignoring the competing candidates

Trump presumably polls well, to a large extent, because he uses this language model (not so much ignoring of the competing candidates recently, but maybe that’s the effect of a primary). This language pattern tends to be used by incumbent presidents running for re-election, and seems to derive from their self-perception as already-successful in the job they’re re-applying for. Trump, similarly, possesses huge self confidence that seems to have the same effect — he perceives himself as (automatically, guaranteed) successful as president.

The dynamic between the successful self-perception issue and the competence issue was hard to separate before; and we’ve used ‘statesmanlike’ to describe the model of language of electoral success. All of the presidential incumbents whom we previously studied had a self-perception of success and a demonstrated competence and we assumed that both were necessary to deploy the required language comfortably and competently. Trump, however, shows that this isn’t so — it’s possible to possess the self-perception of success without the previously demonstrated competence. In Trump’s case, presumably, it is derived from competence in a rather different job: building a financial empire.

The media is in a frenzy about the competence issue for Trump. But our language model explains how it is possible to be popular among voters without demonstrating much competence, or even planned competence, to solve the problems of the day.

Voters don’t care about objective competence in the way that the media do. They care about the underlying personal self-confidence that is revealed in each candidate’s language. The data is very clear about this.

It may even be the rational view that a voter should take. Presidents encounter, in office, many issues that they had not previously formulated a policy for, so self-confidence may be more valuable than prepackaged plans. And voters have learned that most policies do not get implemented in office anyway.

It’s silly to treat Trump as a front runner when no actual vote has yet been cast. But it wouldn’t be surprising if he continues to do well for some time.  Of the other candidates, only Christie shows any sense of the use of positive language but, as a veteran politician, he cannot seem to avoid the need to present policies.

“But I don’t have anything to hide”

This is the common response of many ordinary people when the discussion of (especially) government surveillance programs comes up. And they’re right, up to a point. In a perfect world, innocent people have nothing to fear from government.

The bigger problem, in fact, comes from the data collected and the models built by multinational businesses. Everyone has something to hide from them: the bottom line prices we are willing to pay.

We have not yet quite reached the world of differential pricing. We’ve become accustomed to the idea that the person sitting next to us on a plane may have paid (much) less for the identical travel experience, but we haven’t quite become reconciled to the idea that an online retailer might be charging us more for the same product than they charge other people, let alone that the chocolate bar at the corner store might be more expensive for us. If anything, we’re inclined to think that an organisation that has lots of data about us and has built a detailed model of us might give us a better price.

But it doesn’t require too much prescience to see that this isn’t always going to be the case. The seller’s slogan has always been “all the market can bear”.

Any commercial organization, under the name of customer relationship management, is building a model of your predicted net future value. Their actions towards you are driven by how large this is. Any benefits and discounts you get now are based on the expectation that, over the long haul, they will reap the converse benefits and more. It’s inherently an adversarial relationship.

Now think about the impact of data collection and modelling, especially with the realization that everything collected is there for ever. There’s no possibility of an economic fresh start, no bankruptcy of models that will wipe the slate clean and let you start again.

Negotiation relies on the property that each party holds back their actual bottom line. In a world where your bottom line is probably better known to the entity you’re negotiating with than it is to you, can you ever win? Or even win-win? Now tell me that you have nothing to hide.

[And, in the ongoing discussion of post-Snowden government surveillance, there’s still this enormous blind spot about the fact that multinational businesses collect electronic communication, content and metadata; location; every action on portable devices and some laptops; complete browsing and search histories; and audio around any of these devices. And they’re processing it all extremely hard.]

Results from the first Democratic debate

The debate held on Tuesday night pitted one well known figure (Hillary Clinton) against one up and coming figure (Sanders) and three others with no name recognition except among the wonkiest. The differences in exposure and preparation were obvious. I can’t see that it made any difference to anyone’s opinions.

But it remains interesting to see how well each person did at presenting a persona. Extremely well known politicians do not usually have the luxury of presenting themselves with a new, improved persona because the old one is so well known, so it’s common to find that persona deception scores are low for such candidates. For those who aren’t well-known, the strength of their persona is a blend of how well they can do it personally, and how big the gap is between their previous self-image and the persona that they are trying to project. A relatively unknown candidate with a high persona deception score, therefore, is likely to do well; one with a low score probably will not.

Here are the results from this debate:

deceptdocsThe red and greeen points represent artificial word use corresponding to moderately high amd moderately low levels of persona deception. Clinton, as expected (and from my analysis in the 2008 cycle) has low levels of persona deception. Sanders’s levels are in the mid-range. Chafee is sincere, but this won’t help him with his current level of recognition. O’Malley has the highest level of persona deception, which is a positive indicator for him (for what it’s worth in this crowd). Webb is also in the midrange, but his language use is quite different from that of Sanders.

Islamist violent extremism and anarchist violent extremism

Roughly speaking, three explanations for islamist violent extremism have been put forward:

  1. It’s motivated by a religious ideology (perhaps a perversion of true Islam, but sincerely held by its adherents);
  2. It’s motivated by political or insurgent ends, and so the violence is instrumental;
  3. It’s the result of psychological disturbance in its adherents.

In the months after the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, Marc Sageman argued vigorously for the first explanation, pointing out that those involved in al Qaeda at the time were well-educated and at least middle class, were religious, and showed no signs of psychological disturbances. There was considerable push back to his arguments, mostly promoting Explanation 3 but, in the end, most Western governments came around to his view.

In the decade since, most Western countries have slipped into Explanation 2. I have argued that this is largely because these countries are post-Christian, and so most of those in the political establishment have post-modern ideas about religion as a facade for power. They project this world view onto the Middle Eastern world, and so cannot see that Explanation 1 is even possible — to be religious is to be naive at best and stupid at worst. This leads to perennial underestimation of islamist violent extremist goals and willingness to work towards them.

It’s widely agreed that the motivation for Daesh is a combination of Explanations 1 and 2, strategically Explanation 1, but tactically Explanation 2.

The new feature, however, is that Daesh’s high-volume propaganda is reaching many psychologically troubled individuals in Western countries who find its message to be an organising principle and a pseudo-community.

“Lone wolf” attacks can therefore be divided into two categories: those motivated by Explanation 1, and those motivated by Explanation 3, and the latter are on the rise. Marc Sageman has written about the extent to which foiled “plots” in the U.S. come very close to entrapment of vulnerable individuals who imagine that they would like to be terrorists, and take some tiny initial step, only to find an FBI agent alongside them, urging them to take it further. (M. Sageman, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2014, 565-580)

Understanding these explanations is critical to efforts at de-radicalization. Despite extensive efforts, I have seen very little evidence that de-radicalization actually works. But it make a difference what you think you’re de-radicalizing from. Addressing Explanation 1 seems to be the most common strategy (“your view of Islam is wrong, see the views of respected mainstream Imams, jihad means personal struggle”).

Addressing Explanation 2 isn’t usually framed as de-radicalization but, if the violence is instrumental, then instrumental arguments would help (“it will never work, the consequences are too severe to be worth it”).

Addressing Explanation 3 is something we know how to do, but this explanation isn’t the popular one at present, and there are many pragmatic issues about getting psychological help to people who don’t acknowledge that they need it.

Reading the analysis of anarchist violence in the period from about 1880 to around 1920 has eerie similarities to the analysis of islamist violence in the past 15 years, both in the popular press, and in the more serious literature. It’s clear that there were some (but only a very few) who were in love with anarchist ideology (Explanation 1); many more who saw it as a way (the only way) to change society for the better (Explanation 2) — one of the popular explanations for the fading away of anarchist attacks is that other organisations supporting change developed; but there were also large numbers of troubled individuals who attached themselves to anarchist violence for psychological reasons. It’s largely forgotten how common anarchist attacks became during these few decades. Many were extremely successful — assassinations of a French president, an American president, an Austrian Empress, an Italian king — and, of course, the Great War was inadvertently triggered by an assassination of an Archduke.

Western societies had little more success stemming anarchist violence than we are having with islamist violence. The Great War probably had as much effect as anything, wiping out the demographic most associated with the problem. We will have to come up with a better solution.

(There’s a nice recap of anarchist violence and its connections to islamist violence here.)

Cybersecurity training — the contrasts

I think there must be wide agreement that skills in the cybersecurity domain are highly valuable in the 21st century, but also in extremely short supply.

It’s interesting to compare the number of graduate-level programs focused on cybersecurity in the U.S. and in Canada. A quick search in the U.S. finds that more than 30 colleges (probably a lot more) offer at least a Master’s degree specialising in cybersecurity. There are also at least a handful in the U.K..

The identical search in Canada finds exactly zero such programs (there is one, but it’s not open to civilians). In fact, there are almost no graduate programs in Canada that offer even a single course in cybersecurity.

Country                    Population                Number of programs

U.S.                        319,000,000                      30+

Canada                     30,000,000                        0

U.K.                         64,000,000                        6+

Australia                   23,000,000                       3+

New Zealand              4,000,000                        2+

Part of the problem is structural. The Canadian federal government has the greatest interest in a well-trained cybersecurity pool (to supply the Communications Security Establishment Canada and to provide a path to hardening infrastructure, finance, and high-tech businesses). But Canadian universities are provincially funded, and the provinces don’t have much interest in cybersecurity.

The differences between the U.S. and Canada are stark, and make it clear that Canada is going to have a hard time pulling its weight in the Five Eyes collaboration. And it’s a difficult problem to solve because of the need to bootstrap: there aren’t enough faculty to teach and do research in cybersecurity, because there aren’t enough opportunities to learn how to.

How not to win an election (Canadian leaders economic debate)

I’ve written about what kind of language politicians should use if they want to win elections. The Canadian party leaders economic debate last night was a text book example of how not to do it.

Here’s the playbook that they were apparently working from:

  • On no account be positive about anything. Rose coloured glasses are actively dangerous when talking about economic issues, because expectations never become reality in this domain.
  • Make sure that you provide all of the details of your economic policies (“Our plan will raise fiscal/tax/payments by 2.3% over 27 months”) but on no account tie them to real people or any aspect of their lives.
  • Compare your policies to those of other parties by first explaining the other party’s plan and THEN explaining why it’s a bad idea. Viewers have long attention spans and are probably taking notes anyway.
  • Make sure that viewers understand the smallest differences between your plan and the competition (“our great plan is 2.3% over 27 months, their appalling plan is only 2.2% and over only 26 months”) — the Mr Rumbold Strategy.
  • If you have a good talking point, make sure you use it at least six times (eight would be better).
  • Talk at the same time as everyone else. This helps viewers hone their cocktail party skills.
  • Make sure to refer to every previous action of the other parties going back to the 1930s. Viewers want to consider track record of the long dead when deciding which party to vote for.
  • Change the names that you call people at random moments — use their surnames for a while and then switch to first names, and then switch back.
  • Make sure that when you’re using talking points, you’re fluent, but when you are going extempore, you use lots of “ums” and “ers” so viewers can easily tell which is which.

And if you want to put on a debate, here some useful tips:

  • Preface the debate with 15 mins of punditry by members of the sponsoring organisation, even if they have no television skills.
  • Make sure that the background is artificial and creates edges around the debate participants. Save electricity by using as little lighting as possible. Use dark colours — after all the economic picture is gloomy.
  • Forbid the “moderator” from doing anything other than reading out the questions.
  • Make sure that all of the microphones are live at all times. On no account put microphone controls where the producer can access them.

I expect that, after the performances of everyone involved last night and in the prep, there will be a huge demand from the U.S. candidates to hire these people away for more large scale campaigns.

Results from second Republican debate

Regular readers will know that, especially in a crowded marketplace, politicians try to stand out and attract votes by presenting themselves in the best possible light that they can. This is a form of deception, and carries the word-use signals associated with deception, so it can be measured using some straightforward linguistic analysis.

Generally speaking, the candidate who achieves the highest level of this persona deception wins, so candidates try as hard as they can. There are, however, a number of countervailing forces. First, different candidates have quite different levels of ability to put on this kind of persona (Bill Clinton excelled at it). Second, it seems to be quite exhausting, so that candidates have trouble maintaining it from day to day. Third, the difficulty depends on the magnitude of the difference between the previous role and the new one that is the target of a campaign: if a vice-president runs for president, he is necessarily lumbered with the persona that’s been on view in the previous job; if not, it’s easier to present a new persona and make it seem compelling (e.g. Obama in 2008). Outsiders therefore have a greater opportunity to re-invent themselves. Fourth, it depends on the content of what is said: a speech that’s about pie in the sky can easily present a new persona, while one that talks about a candidate’s track record cannot, because it drags the previous persona into at least the candidate’s mind.

Some kinds of preparation can help to improve the persona being presented — a good actor has to be able to do this. But politicians aren’t usually actors manqué so the levels of persona deception that they achieve from day to day emerge from their subconscious and so provide fine-grained insights into how they’re perceiving themselves.

The results from the second round of debates are shown in the figure:

deceptdocs

The red and green points represent artificial debate participants who use all of the words of the deception model at high frequency and low frequency respectively.

Most of the candidates fall into the band between these two extremes, with Rand Paul with the lowest level of persona deception (which is what you might expect). The highest levels of deception are Christie and Fiorina, who had obviously prepped extensively and were regarded as having done well; and Jindal, who is roughly at the same level, but via completely different word use.

Comparing these to the results from the first round of debates, there are two obvious changes: Trump has moved from being at the low end of the spectrum to being in the upper-middle; and Carson has moved from having very different language patterns from all of the other candidates to being quite similar to most of them. This suggests that both of them are learning to be better politicians (or being sucked into the political machine, depending on your point of view).

The candidates in the early debate have clustered together on the left hand side of the figure, showing that there was a different dynamic in the two different debates. This is an interesting datum about the strength of verbal mimicry.



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