Posts Tagged 'counterterrorism'

Tips for adversarial analytics

I put togethers this compendium of thngs that are useful to know for those starting out in analytics for policing, signals intelligence, counterterrorism, anti-money-laundering, cybersecurity, and customs; and which might be useful to those using analytics when organisational priorities come into conflict with customers (as they almost always do).

Most of the content is either tucked away in academic publications, not publishable by itself, or common knowledge among practitioners but not written down.

I hope you find it helpful (pdf):  Tips for Adversarial Analytics

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What causes extremist violence?

This question has been the subject of active research for more than four decades. There have been many answers that don’t stand up to empirical scrutiny — because the number of those who participate in extremist violence is so small, and because researchers tend to interview them, but fail to interview all those identical to them who didn’t commit violence.

Here’s a list of the properties that we now know don’t lead to extremist violence:

  • ideology or religion
  • deprivation or unhappiness
  • political/social alienation
  • discrimination
  • moral outrage
  • activism or illegal non-violent political action
  • attitudes/belief

How do we know this? Mostly because, if you take a population that exhibits any of these properties (typically many hundreds of thousand) you find that one or two have committed violence, but the others haven’t. So properties such as these have absolutely no predictive power.

On the other hand, there are a few properties that do lead to extremist violence:

  • being the child of immigrants
  • having access to a local charismatic figure
  • travelling to a location where one’s internal narrative is reinforced
  • participation in a small group echo chamber with those who have similar patterns of thought
  • having a disconnected-disordered or hypercaring-compelled personality

These don’t form a diagnostic set, because there are still many people who have one or more of them, and do not commit violence. But they are a set of danger signals, and the more of them an individual has, the more attention should be paid to them (on the evidence of the past 15 years).

You can find a full discussion of these issues, and the evidence behind them, in ““Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists: Distinguishing Between Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and Why It Matters” in Violent Extremism and Terrorism, Queen’s University Press, 2019.

 

Even more security theatre

I happened to visit a consulate to do some routine paperwork. Here’s the security process I encountered:

  1. Get identity checked from passport, details entered (laboriously) into online system.
  2. Cell phone locked away.
  3. Wanded by metal detection wand.
  4. Sent by secure elevator to another floor, to a waiting room with staff behind bullet-proof glass.

Here’s the thing: I got to carry my (unexamined) backpack with me through the whole process!

And what’s the threat from a cell phone in this context? Embarrassing pictures of the five year old posters on the wall of the waiting room?

I understand that government departments have difficulty separating serious from trivial risks, because if anything happened they would be blamed, regardless of how low-probability the risk was. But there’s no political reason not to make whatever precautions you decide to take actually helpful to reduce the perceived risks.

Security theatre lives

Sydney tests its emergency notification system in the downtown core at the same time of day every time. So if a person wanted to cause an incident, guess what time they would choose?

It also seems to be done on Fridays, which is exactly the worst day to choose, since it’s the most common day for islamist incidents.

Security theatre = doing things that sound like they improve security without actually improving them (and sometimes making them worse).

“But I don’t have anything to hide” Part III

I haven’t been able to verify it, but Marc Goodman mentions (in an interview with Tim Ferriss) that the Mumbai terrorists searched the online records of hostages when they were deciding who to kill. Another reason not to be profligate about what you post on social media.

Come back King Canute, all is forgiven

You will remember that King Canute held a demonstration in which he showed his courtiers that he did not have the power to hold back the tide.

Senior officials in Washington desperately need courtiers who will show them, with equal force, that encryption has the same sort of property. If it’s done right, encrypted material can’t be decrypted by fiat. And any backdoor to the encryption process can’t be made available only to the good guys.

The current story about Apple and the encrypted phone used by one of the San Bernadino terrorists is not helping to make this issue any clearer to government, largely because the media coverage is so muddled that nobody could be blamed for missing the point.

The basic facts seem to be these: the phone is encrypted, the FBI have been trying to get in to it for some time, and there’s no way for anyone, Apple included, to burn through the encryption without the password. This is all as it was designed to be.

The FBI is now asking Apple to alter the access control software so that, for example, the ten-try limit on password guesses is disabled. Apple is refusing on two grounds. First, this amounts to the government compelling them to construct something, a form of conscription that is illegal (presumably the FBI could contract with Apple to build the required software but presumably Apple has no appetite for this).

Second, Apple argues that the existence proof of such a construct would make it impossible for them to resist the same request from other governments, where the intent might be less benign. This is an interesting argument. On the one hand, if they can build it now, they can build it then, and nobody’s claiming that the required construct is impossible. On the other hand, there’s no question that being able to do something in the abstract is psychologically quite different from having done it.

But it does seem as if Apple is using its refusal as a marketing tool for its high-mindedness and pro-privacy stance. Public opinion might have an effect if only the public could work out what the issues are — but the media have such a tenuous grasp that every story I saw today guaranteed greater levels of confusion.

Islamist violent extremism and anarchist violent extremism

Roughly speaking, three explanations for islamist violent extremism have been put forward:

  1. It’s motivated by a religious ideology (perhaps a perversion of true Islam, but sincerely held by its adherents);
  2. It’s motivated by political or insurgent ends, and so the violence is instrumental;
  3. It’s the result of psychological disturbance in its adherents.

In the months after the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, Marc Sageman argued vigorously for the first explanation, pointing out that those involved in al Qaeda at the time were well-educated and at least middle class, were religious, and showed no signs of psychological disturbances. There was considerable push back to his arguments, mostly promoting Explanation 3 but, in the end, most Western governments came around to his view.

In the decade since, most Western countries have slipped into Explanation 2. I have argued that this is largely because these countries are post-Christian, and so most of those in the political establishment have post-modern ideas about religion as a facade for power. They project this world view onto the Middle Eastern world, and so cannot see that Explanation 1 is even possible — to be religious is to be naive at best and stupid at worst. This leads to perennial underestimation of islamist violent extremist goals and willingness to work towards them.

It’s widely agreed that the motivation for Daesh is a combination of Explanations 1 and 2, strategically Explanation 1, but tactically Explanation 2.

The new feature, however, is that Daesh’s high-volume propaganda is reaching many psychologically troubled individuals in Western countries who find its message to be an organising principle and a pseudo-community.

“Lone wolf” attacks can therefore be divided into two categories: those motivated by Explanation 1, and those motivated by Explanation 3, and the latter are on the rise. Marc Sageman has written about the extent to which foiled “plots” in the U.S. come very close to entrapment of vulnerable individuals who imagine that they would like to be terrorists, and take some tiny initial step, only to find an FBI agent alongside them, urging them to take it further. (M. Sageman, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2014, 565-580)

Understanding these explanations is critical to efforts at de-radicalization. Despite extensive efforts, I have seen very little evidence that de-radicalization actually works. But it make a difference what you think you’re de-radicalizing from. Addressing Explanation 1 seems to be the most common strategy (“your view of Islam is wrong, see the views of respected mainstream Imams, jihad means personal struggle”).

Addressing Explanation 2 isn’t usually framed as de-radicalization but, if the violence is instrumental, then instrumental arguments would help (“it will never work, the consequences are too severe to be worth it”).

Addressing Explanation 3 is something we know how to do, but this explanation isn’t the popular one at present, and there are many pragmatic issues about getting psychological help to people who don’t acknowledge that they need it.

Reading the analysis of anarchist violence in the period from about 1880 to around 1920 has eerie similarities to the analysis of islamist violence in the past 15 years, both in the popular press, and in the more serious literature. It’s clear that there were some (but only a very few) who were in love with anarchist ideology (Explanation 1); many more who saw it as a way (the only way) to change society for the better (Explanation 2) — one of the popular explanations for the fading away of anarchist attacks is that other organisations supporting change developed; but there were also large numbers of troubled individuals who attached themselves to anarchist violence for psychological reasons. It’s largely forgotten how common anarchist attacks became during these few decades. Many were extremely successful — assassinations of a French president, an American president, an Austrian Empress, an Italian king — and, of course, the Great War was inadvertently triggered by an assassination of an Archduke.

Western societies had little more success stemming anarchist violence than we are having with islamist violence. The Great War probably had as much effect as anything, wiping out the demographic most associated with the problem. We will have to come up with a better solution.

(There’s a nice recap of anarchist violence and its connections to islamist violence here.)


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