Posts Tagged 'counterterrorism'

Understanding risk at the disaster end of the spectrum

In conventional risk analysis, risk is often expressed as

risk = threat probability x potential loss

When the values of the terms on the right hand side are in the middle of their ranges, then our intuition seems to understand this equation quite well.

But when the values are near their extremes, our intuition goes out the window, as the world’s coronavirus experience shows. The pandemic is what Taleb calls a black swan, an event where the threat probability is extremely low, but the potential loss is extremely high. For example, if the potential loss is of the order of 10^9 (a billion) then a threat probability of 1 in a thousand still has a risk of magnitude a million.

I came across another disaster waiting to happen, with the same kind fo characteristics as the coronavirus pandemic — cyber attacks on water treatment facilities.

https://www.csoonline.com/article/3541837/attempted-cyberattack-highlights-vulnerability-of-global-water-infrastructure.html

In the U.S. water treatment facilities are small organizations that don’t have specialized IT staff who can protect their systems. But the consequences of cyber attacks on such facilities can cause mass casualties. While electricity grids, Internet infrastructure, and financial systems have received some protection attention, water treatment is the forgotten sibling. A classic example of a small (but growing) threat probability but a huge potential loss.

The threat isn’t even theoretical. Attacks have already been attempted.

Detecting intent and abuse in natural language

One of my students has developed a system for detecting intent and abuse in natural language. As part of the validation, he has designed a short survey to get human assessments of how the system performs.

If you’d like to participate, the url is

aquarius.cs.queensu.ca

Thanks in advance!

Tips for adversarial analytics

I put togethers this compendium of thngs that are useful to know for those starting out in analytics for policing, signals intelligence, counterterrorism, anti-money-laundering, cybersecurity, and customs; and which might be useful to those using analytics when organisational priorities come into conflict with customers (as they almost always do).

Most of the content is either tucked away in academic publications, not publishable by itself, or common knowledge among practitioners but not written down.

I hope you find it helpful (pdf):  Tips for Adversarial Analytics

What causes extremist violence?

This question has been the subject of active research for more than four decades. There have been many answers that don’t stand up to empirical scrutiny — because the number of those who participate in extremist violence is so small, and because researchers tend to interview them, but fail to interview all those identical to them who didn’t commit violence.

Here’s a list of the properties that we now know don’t lead to extremist violence:

  • ideology or religion
  • deprivation or unhappiness
  • political/social alienation
  • discrimination
  • moral outrage
  • activism or illegal non-violent political action
  • attitudes/belief

How do we know this? Mostly because, if you take a population that exhibits any of these properties (typically many hundreds of thousand) you find that one or two have committed violence, but the others haven’t. So properties such as these have absolutely no predictive power.

On the other hand, there are a few properties that do lead to extremist violence:

  • being the child of immigrants
  • having access to a local charismatic figure
  • travelling to a location where one’s internal narrative is reinforced
  • participation in a small group echo chamber with those who have similar patterns of thought
  • having a disconnected-disordered or hypercaring-compelled personality

These don’t form a diagnostic set, because there are still many people who have one or more of them, and do not commit violence. But they are a set of danger signals, and the more of them an individual has, the more attention should be paid to them (on the evidence of the past 15 years).

You can find a full discussion of these issues, and the evidence behind them, in ““Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists: Distinguishing Between Countering Violent Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence, and Why It Matters” in Violent Extremism and Terrorism, Queen’s University Press, 2019.

 

Even more security theatre

I happened to visit a consulate to do some routine paperwork. Here’s the security process I encountered:

  1. Get identity checked from passport, details entered (laboriously) into online system.
  2. Cell phone locked away.
  3. Wanded by metal detection wand.
  4. Sent by secure elevator to another floor, to a waiting room with staff behind bullet-proof glass.

Here’s the thing: I got to carry my (unexamined) backpack with me through the whole process!

And what’s the threat from a cell phone in this context? Embarrassing pictures of the five year old posters on the wall of the waiting room?

I understand that government departments have difficulty separating serious from trivial risks, because if anything happened they would be blamed, regardless of how low-probability the risk was. But there’s no political reason not to make whatever precautions you decide to take actually helpful to reduce the perceived risks.

Security theatre lives

Sydney tests its emergency notification system in the downtown core at the same time of day every time. So if a person wanted to cause an incident, guess what time they would choose?

It also seems to be done on Fridays, which is exactly the worst day to choose, since it’s the most common day for islamist incidents.

Security theatre = doing things that sound like they improve security without actually improving them (and sometimes making them worse).

“But I don’t have anything to hide” Part III

I haven’t been able to verify it, but Marc Goodman mentions (in an interview with Tim Ferriss) that the Mumbai terrorists searched the online records of hostages when they were deciding who to kill. Another reason not to be profligate about what you post on social media.